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Macri: Condon Report

The Fall of Hong Kong
The Condon Report
edited by David Macri

D

uring the battle of Hong Kong
several US Army officers
participated in events and were
subsequently held by the Japanese
army after the surrender of the colony
on 25 December 1941. One of these
was Major Reynolds Condon, an
artillery officer who was serving as
an assistant military attaché. Major
Condon was released along with
other diplomatic personnel in mid
1942 and he presumably returned to
the United States via Brazil aboard
the Swedish registered SS Gripsholm,
but details on his journey remain
uncertain. 1 On 11 August 1942,
Major Condon submitted a report
to US Army Military Intelligence
on the British defence of Hong
Kong. His scathing criticism
is often incorrect in the details
and is strongly influenced by
personal bias. He also fails
to recognize that Far Eastern
defences were inadequate
in part because of previous
American indifference,
and his comments on the
higher direction of Allied
strategy in southern China
are not completely accurate.
Nevertheless, his report,
especially the latter half,
helps shed some light on
aspects of the battle for which
he was an eyewitness, and
when Condon focuses on
matters of which he had
direct personal involvement
he provides additional
useful information on some

Abstract: David Macri recently
defended his PhD thesis “Hong
Kong in the Sino-Japanese War: The
Logistics of Collective Security in
South China, 1935-1941” at the
University of Hong Kong. The thesis
raises new and important questions
about the strategic background to
the events of late 1941. Dr. Macri
is also interested in operational and
tactical issues and this report from
the US National Archives is of special
interest to Canadians. The author,
Major Reynolds Condon, was an
American assistant military attaché
in Hong Kong who witnessed the
battle before being released back to
the US. His report, while not always
factually correct, helps shed some
light on aspects of the battle for which
he was an eyewitness.
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significant actions and personalities.
Given the circumstances of Hong
Kong’s isolation as well as the overall
combat effectiveness of Allied forces
in general at that time, his account
can be considered unbalanced. His
views are sometimes emblematic of
the contemptuous attitudes often
exhibited towards Chinese and
British officers by Americans who
later served under General Joseph
Stilwell in the China-Burma-India
command. Whether views such as
those expressed were formed because
of defeats at places like Hong Kong
or were already established amongst
American military officers is difficult
to assess fully, but it is useful to
remember that untried United States
Army forces also performed
poorly during their initiation
to combat in a variety of
different theatres. Condon’s
report is still significant,
however, as it gives a third
party account of the battle that
has hitherto gone unnoticed. It
is reproduced below.
Colonel Reynolds Condon (right)
was an American assistant
military attaché in Hong Kong
when the colony was attacked
by Japan in December 1941.
Condon was released with
other diplomatic personnel in
mid-1942 and subsequently
wrote a scathing report on the
British defence of the colony.
He is pictured here talking to
Major-General Frank Merrill in
China in 1944.
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THE FALL OF HONGKONG
In view of the nature of this report no copies will be distributed or shown to any of our co-belligerents.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION W.D.G.S.
Military Attaché Report China
Subject: Fall of Hongkong
From: Assistant Military Attaché Hongkong
Report No.: Special Report No. 1
Date: August 20, 1942
Source and degree of reliability: Personal observation of U.S. Army Officers.

Summary
Hongkong was attacked on

when the attack came so was not present

held. From this basic attitude of mind it

during the battle.

was an easy step into slipshod training,

December 8, 1941 by an estimated 2

Since it was quite impossible to

Japanese divisions, 48 pieces of artillery,

save any notes, certain statements made

20 planes. It capitulated December 25,

are undoubtedly incorrect in detail; as a

1941. Due to a combination of defeatism,

picture they are accurate.

careless and faulty planning, which in turn
led to disaster.
1. Plan

lethargy, complacency, and stupidity, no

Many stories were heard of good and

The staff officers with whom from

resistance worthy of the name was offered

intelligent fighting in unvisited sectors.

time to time Major Wood and I discussed

by the British.

While the reports may have been correct,

the defense plan stated that they were

The undersigned was serving in the

it is believed the outcome of these

authorized to reveal any information we

Hongkong office of the Military Attaché

engagements justifies the conclusion that

asked for. In practice, a question was

to China at the time of the Japanese

the fighting was everywhere about the

replied to in such a roundabout fashion

attack on the Colony, December 8,

same as that observed.

that frequently it was not answered at

1941. With me at the time were Major

Practically everything stated about

all. One thing was definite: the mainland

R.A. Grussendorf, Military Attache for

the British is derogatory in the extreme.

would be held for three months, the island

Air, and Captain William M. Clarkson,

This is regrettable, but it is what we

an additional three.

Adjutant of the American Military Mission

observed. It is firmly believed that had

The means were as reported to the

to China, both in Hongkong for medical

the teachings of our service schools been

Military Intelligence Division shortly prior

treatment. During the fighting we visited

energetically put into practice Hongkong

to the outbreak of war and were, according

and served with as many organizations

would have been held indefinitely against

to a faulty memory, about as follows: Navy,

as time, physical condition and other

the comparatively light attack delivered.

seven motor torpedo boats (other ships

duties permitted. These officers are each

If it appears that the undersigned

were to leave when hostilities started),

submitting an individual report, Major

exceeded his authority in meddling in the

several hundred dockyard workers: Air

Grussendorf’s including the subject of air

affairs of the British Army, it can only be

Force, four obsolete unarmed ships, no

operations. Their verbal statements to me

said that as the senior American officer

airfield suitable for fast pursuits: Army,

were of great value in forming a picture

present I felt it my duty to use every effort

six battalions of infantry (two Canadian,

fitting in with that which I observed myself.

to keep them fighting as long as possible.

two Indian, one Scotch, one English),

Major Stuart Wood, F.A., stationed

In my opinion, the chief reason for

artillery sufficient to man nine 9.2” guns,

in Hongkong, was invaluable in obtaining

the rapid fall of Hongkong was lack of the

eight 6” howitzers, eleven 4.5” mountain

information on the defense plans. He was

aggressive spirit, bred from a knowledge

howitzers, eight 18 pounders, six or

in Manila undergoing surgical treatment

by all ranks that the Colony could not be

eight 4.5” AA guns and a few AA guns of
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lesser calibre, one battalion of engineers,

Singapore artillery (Chinese and Indian,

detachments of signals, ordnance etc.,

officered mostly by whites).

Defense against aircraft was
necessarily largely passive. Antiaircraft

- a total of some 9,000 regulars. The

The island of Hongkong likewise was

guns were all located on Hongkong,

Hongkong volunteer force, about 3,000,

defended by pillboxes near the shoreline.

sited to protect the triangle: Navy yards

largely composed of Europeans, trained

The shoreline was wired, but wire nowhere

at Hongkong and Aberdeen, West Point.

as infantry or artillery for about two years.

was in sufficient abundance. There

Tunnels had been dug for an estimated

Foodstuffs were ample. Pointed questions

were no entrenchments. Pillboxes were

one-sixth of the population. Dispersal

about ammunition were answered by, “I

equipped with two to six machineguns,

areas in the hills (stocked with foodstuffs

think we have plenty, you know,” or “A

many of them light Brens. There was

and materials to construct light shelters)

goodish bit I believe.”

a considerable number of small but

had been designated but not reported to

The method to be employed was

excellent searchlights. About ten antitank

the people. Air raid practices had been

passive, consisting of a rapid withdrawal

guns and the eight 18-pounder field

held frequently, wardens of various kinds

to the line of hills stretching across the

pieces were in position on the shore. The

seemed to be well instructed and to know

Kowloon peninsula. When forced to

Middlesex battalion manned the pillboxes

their duties. Practice blackouts were

evacuate, withdrawal would be made to

from the north to the southeast and the

good.

the island. The Kowloon line consisted

few on Aberdeen Island. They were

of concrete pillboxes. A few days before

supported by one Canadian battalion.

the war I still saw no barbed wire, except

The other Canadian battalion had the

At the time of taking up my duties

on the beaches, and no entrenchments.

southeast sector. From east to north

in Hongkong about October 1, 1941, I

The infantry consisted of three battalions

the shoreline was lightly held by the

was amazed at the carefree attitude of

(Scots on the left, two Indian battalions

Volunteers; this sector was to be taken

the officers of the garrison. A gradually

in the center and right) supported by 4.5”

over by the Indians on withdrawal.

increasing knowledge of the state of the

howitzers manned by the Hongkong-

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011
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was shared by Major Stuart Wood, F.A.,

of the Indians remained at their old posts

the British to send a large liaison unit,

and Captain Hudson, USN, Commanding

on the island. The reason for the delay in

equipped with radio, as soon as possible.

the South China Patrol. Captain Hudson,

taking up their proper positions was given

We wanted officers from Hongkong to

for the Navy, Major Wood and myself, for

as lack of barrack space, though how

travel in unoccupied Kwangtung, make

the Army, tried our best to point out to

that entered was not clear. The British

contact with local commanders, and

the Commanding General by means of

apparently did not consider a thorough

so be available and equipped to serve

conversations with his staff officers what

knowledge of the ground to be of much

as advisers in operations against the

we could not consider basic errors. For

importance.

Japanese rear. We especially wanted a

the Army, these were:
A. The defense was not organized
in depth. Behind the line of pillboxes

(Note: The move was started

plan of concerted Sino-British action, even

December 5th and was not completed

hoping the Chinese could be induced to

until the night of December 7-8th)

make a surprise attack on the airfield

there were no fortifications other than a

E. The plan for immediate withdrawal

at Canton. The military representative

few concrete OP’s, practically unarmed.

to the Kowloon line gave up an excellent

in Hongkong of Generalissimo Chiang

We considered this the most grievous

chance to harass the advancing enemy,

was anxious to obtain British aid and to

error, especially aggravated since the

slow down his advance, and cause

cooperate along the above lines. These

lines were not made continuous by

casualties with little loss to us. It also gave

ideas were still under advisement on

trenches. The British stated they did not

up the chance of making contact with local

December 8th.

have sufficient men to man the fixed

Chinese guerrilla units.

I. While the foreign population was

defenses and still have proper supports

F. The one airfield was inadequate

well instructed about air raids (almost all

and reserves; they did not agree with our

but could have been promptly enlarged

of them had specific duties in the ARP),

contention that the fewer the troops the

sufficiently to take care of fifty pursuit

the Chinese population was largely

more mobile should be the defense.

ships by razing a few blocks of dwelling

uninstructed. Assignments were not

B. The disposition of the Middlesex,

houses. This the British thought was too

made to the inadequate dugouts. Those

with its Canadian support, was extremely

costly. As the event turned out, it probably

who could not be accommodated were

faulty. Each battalion should have

made no difference due to shortage of

not assigned dispersal areas or routes to

been assigned its sector. This met with

planes.

reach them. We suggested that at least

agreement, though nothing was done.

G. Not enough use was made of

one person from each house be actually

C. The 18-pounders should not have

Chinese manpower. Our contention

taken to the proper dispersal area; that

been in position. The guns were World

was that Chinese could be trained in a

definite assignments to shelters be

War field pieces, the best weapon against

short time to man pillboxes and artillery

made. The reply was that it would disrupt

landing craft the British had. Positions

pieces and to act as labor troops, thus

business for a day and that the Chinese

taken could not cover the entire shoreline.

releasing a number of trained good troops

when frightened always run for the hills

We believed these guns should have

for reserves. After much discussion the

anyway.

been held in readiness. With suitably

British did commence the organization

selected positions, two guns could have

of a Chinese machine gun battalion.

been in action in any part of the island in

Enlistments were opened about the

About 5:30 a.m., December 8th,

a maximum of five minutes, and the eight

middle of November for the first cadre of

there was a clash with Japanese patrols

pieces in about thirty. Guns remained

fifty men. There were over 600 volunteers

at the Kowloon border. A raid of nine

where they were, largely in the west and

the first day.

dive bombers on the Kai-tek airfield at

south.

2. Outbreak of Hostilities

H. There was no proper liaison

7:55 a.m. destroyed one clipper at her

D. When the garrison was reinforced

with the Chinese Kwangtung forces

moorings, six CNAC ships and the four

with Canadians, vital time was wasted in

and no proper scheme for operating

army planes on the ground.

sending troops to their battle stations. The

in the Japanese rear. The only plans

Canadians arrived on November 16th and

were to send a liaison officer to Chinese

were disembarked in Kowloon. Their one

headquarters and from one to three

These days were largely dominated

period of five days in the field was spent

commandos from Burma, after the

by confusion. Fighting was in progress in

in Kowloon. The Scots and one battalion

war should have started. We wanted

Kowloon, the withdrawal going according
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to plan. Planned demolitions were

headquarters dugout known as the Battle

an unlucky break with no particular blame

reported being carried out 100%. The

Box. Visits to the front were delayed owing

attached to anyone. The withdrawal had

end of the period saw the Kowloon line

to difficulties in obtaining the requisite

been beautifully carried out with almost

manned, everything presumably in order.

passes.

no loss.

Air raids were light but frequent. At
first everyone who could took cover in the

By time the physical strain on military
4. December 11 – 13

personnel was becoming increasingly

dugouts and stone buildings; in a day or

On December 11th it was announced

evident. From the outbreak of hostilities

so most people went about their business

that Kowloon could no longer be held

key personnel had remained at their

unless ordered into cover by an air raid

and would be evacuated that day.

posts day and night taking almost no

warden; within a short time it was realized

Unfortunately the order included the

sleep, keeping awake on whiskey and

that the sirens were doing more damage

police force, leaving the inhabitants at

tea. At Headquarters gossip seemed to

than the enemy and they were seldom

the mercy of Chinese looters. So many

be the order of the day, punctuated by

sounded thereafter.

stories were heard of the ensuing reign

interminable telephone conversations in

of terror that there must have been

which the personal element outweighed

considerable pillage.

the official by three to one.

Few if any of the Chinese went to
the dispersal areas, leaving those of us
who had seen the slaughter of civilians

About this time the Japanese

The police force was mobilized into

at Chungking and Chengtu uneasy at

emplaced a battery of 360 mm howitzers

the army but was, I believe, never used

the thought of what havoc just a few

within range of Hongkong and fired

in the fighting.

bombers might at any moment create in

counterbattery and interdiction fires.

the overcrowded tenements of West Point

Confusion in the city lessened

On December 12th it was revealed

somewhat as the various administrations

that one battalion of Indians, with a few

and boards became slightly more efficient.

The stores were thronged with

4.5” howitzers, were still on the mainland

Air raids continued without causing

officers. Some were hurriedly buying

at Devil’s Peak. They were evacuated that

much damage or excitement amongst

uniforms as they did not have the proper

night across the eastern channel without

the populace. The enemy brought up

kit. Some were buying provisions,

loss.

more long range guns but did not heavily

or Wanchai.

toilet articles, etc., for their families as

The general opinion of the military

uniformed personnel took precedence

at this time seemed to be that the

in being served. Everybody was busy in

situation was not too bad. The collapse

buying essentials.

of resistance in Kowloon was attributed to

These days were marked by inaction

the fall of the one pillbox; considered to be

on our part while the enemy brought up

Visits were made to the Intelligence

bombard the city.
5. December 14 – 19

Section in its old offices in the Naval
US National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA) M1733 Photo 16.

Dockyard. Information was meagre in
the extreme. They didn’t know what units
were attacking or how many, and did not
seem to care. When the sirens went we
all trooped out of the wooden building and
stood about the yard gossiping until the all
clear sounded. There was no unseemly
haste in moving the office to its battle
station in the colossal air-conditioned

A squadron of Kawasaki Ki-32 “Mary”
aircraft enroute to bomb Hong Kong,
December 1941.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011
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Japanese troops march into Kowloon, 15 December 1941.

means for a final assault. The Japanese

working their mortars, shelling downtown

to the shore and disembarked unopposed.

brought up more artillery, to an estimated

Hongkong. The mortar bomb had a thin

They proceeded inland rapidly, the first

48 pieces of 6” or greater calibre. However,

shell case, a super-quick fuse. Due to the

body to report them being a police patrol.

they contended themselves with a

very fine fragmentation, little damage was

A ferry service was immediately instituted,

minimum of shelling, still counterbattery

caused except to morale. I was informed

operated all night and the next day. Fire

and road interdiction. Counterbattery on

that we could not fire on these targets with

was not brought to bear on these boats

our part was greatly hampered due to

18-pounders because we had no time

though they were harried in one or two

lack of sound ranging equipment. Flash

shell or shrapnel, the short range making

attacks by motor torpedo boats. By noon

ranging telescopes were eventually set

percussion shell nearly valueless on the

of the 19th a force of possible 2,000

up but were of little use as enemy guns

hard-surfaced waterfront. I was informed

men, equipped to include trench mortars,

were well behind the crest and there was

that the 4.5” howitzers could not reach

had been landed. They had advanced

no inter-communication between flash

the target (this information was certainly

to Wongneicheong Gap, successfully

stations. The British seemed perfectly

false). To the best of my observation not

cutting the main road of communication

satisfied with sending over 10 or 20

even long range machine gun fire was

between the northern and southern parts

rounds of 6” shells in the general direction

turned on the at first exposed Japanese.

of the island, leaving only the western

of a battery firing; when the battery

On the night of December 18-19 the

coast road (partially dominated by fire) as

ceased firing it was announced as

Japanese effected a landing on North

communication between the two halves

“silenced.” As far as I know we fired not

Point. How this happened I do not know,

of the garrison.

a round of interdiction fire.

but from conversations with numerous

A general counterattack was ordered

The Japanese set up trench mortars

people construct it as follows: A single

for 3:30 p.m., December 19th, but this was

on the Kowloon waterfront from which

motor driven fishing boat containing an

a dismal failure.

positions we could plainly see them

officer and twenty men simply chugged up

70
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/8

6

Macri: Condon Report
6. December 20 – 25

Though most observers with whom I

much effort. The conversations were

A continuation of the picture of lack

have talked put the figures much higher,

largely personal, including inquiries as

of resolve and inefficiency, defeatism

it is my guess that casualties in killed

to the well-being of the caller and mutual

penetrated all ranks. There was no

and wounded did not exceed 3,000 for

friends. Each call lasted several minutes.

desire to go out after the enemy. Physical

the Japanese and 2,000 for the British.

Then he would groan and say, “This

condition of the troops became steadily

Civilian casualties during the fighting

bloody administration, administration all

worse while that of the officers improved

probably did not exceed 500.

the time!” Not a round was fired by eight

slightly, as they began to see the necessity
of sleep.

the next morning. At this time a captain,
8. Leadership

to be his executive, reported and I was

The British never properly organized

In an attempt to show how faulty was

any position. Isolated groups took up

the leadership it is believed not amiss to

At 4:00 p.m. I found he was in much

position without mortars, machine

discuss in detail some of my dealings

better physical condition. As I entered he

guns, or artillery support. They did not

with certain high ranking officers. Not

and his executive were trying to think of

entrench. They had no communication

all of the officers with whom I came in

what corrections to consider in plotting the

with their higher commanders or with

contact showed up in the same light as

direction of a battery recently fired upon.

each other. Supply even of food and

the following four, but in general all ranks

The battery plotted out in the bay. They

ammunition was the worry of the smallest

displayed the same military ignorance.

were elated at having fired twenty rounds

unit commanders, none ever being sent
forward automatically.
In the city the water supply had failed

relieved until dusk.

of 6” and silenced the battery.
A. Commanding Officer of the
Western Group, Royal Artillery.

A few days later I was acting as
observer in an OP overlooking Aberdeen.

due to bursting of exposed mains. This

I reported to this major for duty

Just at dawn three motor torpedo boats

was not as serious as might be imagined

about 10: p.m. the night of December

came in from patrol and tied up beside

since the population promptly reopened

11th at his OP at Wanchai Gap. His

one such boat already at the dock. I

long unused wells as well as making use

command consisted of four 6” and four

telephoned this major with somewhat of

of several running streams.

4.5” howitzers. I found him literally bent

the following conversation:

Intermingling of units had reached

double with lumbago. He dosed himself

“Sir, there are four motor torpedo

what must surely have been the acme of

liberally with whiskey. At short intervals

boats tied up beam to beam at Aberdeen.”

confusion. Commanders everywhere took

he groaned with pain. He stated he had

“What’s that old fellow? I say, how

and used whatever men they could, not

not slept for three days; could not trust his

are you making out? Is your food coming

only making no attempt to return them to

orderly to awaken him for telephone calls.

out alright? What’s this I hear about your

their proper units but actually forbidding

No fires were scheduled. To my query

sending in three signalmen, that’s their

them to return.

as to why the two enemy supply roads

post, you know, what?”

About noon December 25th a

were not being interdicted he replied

“I have no damned use for the

conference down to include battalion

that he didn’t know but presumed there

signalmen and they had better get to

commanders was called. The decision

must be some reason. For the time my

work digging pits for your guns there at

to s u r r e n d e r u n c o n d i ti o n a l l y w a s

duties were to merely stay awake and

the Gap. How about those boats?”

undoubtedly the only one to make under

call him if the phone rang. I was supplied

“Well, what about them?

the existing conditions. Surrender was

with the folder of orders and instructions

“The Japs will get them.”

made by individual units from about three

for the artillery, to improve my time; he

“Well, old fellow, that really is sort of

to five o’clock.

laboriously climbed into the high bunk

a naval show you know. Not our business

hung on the wall. All night long, as soon

at all really. Hope you got your breakfast

as the telephone rang, he climbed down

all right. If there is anything I can do for

It is most difficult to arrive at any

to talk, although the majority of calls could

you let me know. Cheerio, old chap.”

reasonable estimate of casualties. British

have been answered by me. He did not

units were so inextricably mixed, and

follow the obvious course of lying down

their administration so bad, that not even

on the map table, from which position he

B. The Chief of Royal Artillery.

headquarters had any idea of the losses.

could talk over the wall telephone without

On the morning of December 12th

7. Casualties

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011
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I spent two hours trying to find this

supply it to him? I said there was probably

On December 12th he seemed dazed

Brigadier, eventually locating him at

one chance in a thousand that Manila had

from fatigue. He questioned me about

his living quarters. He was standing

some out-dated equipment that could be

conditions and seemed anxious to hear

holding a necktie while his Chinese boy

flown over. If I radioed to find out about

my views. I felt constrained to report as

was packing trunks and suitcases. He

that he would cease counterbattery and

follows:

apparently did not recognize me so I told

interdict the roads by which the shells

(1) His artillery was being very badly

him who I was, stated that I had been with

were being brought up? He agreed. I

handled, and recommended that he either

his Western Group Commander the night

sent a radio to General MacArthur asking

take over the functions himself or appoint

before, and asked to see him on matters I

if it was possible that he had any such

a competent chief. He replied that he

considered urgent. He replied courteously

equipment. I was not later in position to

was not an artillerist, that the Brigadier

that he would be glad to have a talk with

observe if the roads were interdicted.

seemed sure of his ground, and that he

me, but he was very busy. Could I wait for

On December 19th I called on the

him in the Battle Box? After over an hour

Brigadier at his position in the Battle

(2) Of all targets, the Standard Oil

of waiting he still had not appeared.

Box. He did not deny a report I had heard

tanks with their thousands of gallons of

About December 15th I again called

that the Japanese were bringing troops

gasoline stood out as the easiest and

on this gentleman at his office in the

across the channel in small boats and

most promising. He was surprised that

Battle Box. We discussed fires; I pointed

were not being fired upon. I asked why

they had not been demolished. (The tanks

out that Hongkong was falling while

18-pounders were not being rushed to

were never fired upon.)

his guns were cold, suggested that his

the scene, to which he replied, “Sir, the

counterbattery was probably completely

guns are at their posts!”

ineffective, requested him to fire instead

had nobody else for the post.

(3) The men, and to a great extent the
officers, were terrifically impressed with
the fact that the Japanese had control of

on ships still floating in the harbor, the

C. The Commanding General. He

the air, we had nothing. I pointed out that

Standard Oil tanks, and interdiction on

spent almost his entire time in the Battle

actually the Japanese were making little

the two supply roads. He replied that he

Box. He may have visited the troops but I

use of this superiority, that bombers were

had no sound locater apparatus to spot

did not hear of it. He did not sleep for the

causing comparatively small damage, that

the Japanese batteries, and couldn’t we

first three days and very little thereafter.

reconnaissance planes were seldom seen

Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 114877

The remains of the Lye Mun Battery as they appeared in 1945. The narrows of the
Lye Mun Passage were one of the routes used by the Japanese to reach the island.
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This Japanese photograph shows the bombing of Victoria, 19 December 1941.
over the troop positions. I felt he should

On the night of December 24-25 he

leads to a better understanding of events

point this out to the command to offset to

permitted a great deal of drinking in

than can general observations, the

some degree the general loss of morale.

his CP dugout. He and the major who

following incidents are added to those

He was interested, but said the men would

commanded the right of his line indulged

reported in the previous paragraph. They

find it out for themselves. They never did.

in a several hours’ long bitter argument

add little to this report, serving only as

(4) Officers did little to bolster the

over the proper method of representing

background.

morale of the men. They were largely

troop positions on a map. It was continuing

interested in their own affairs, let the men

when I left at 1:00 a.m.

was experienced in locating an artillery

look after themselves, did not call men

The morning of December 25th a staff

C.P. The C.P. was in a little ravine and

to task when they made discouraged

officer of the commanding general

neither the sentinel on duty at the ravine

statements in their presence. He was

visited the dugout to give orders for

entrance nor any member of the adjacent

apparently startled, stated he would see

a counterattack that afternoon. The

road block guard (which it was necessary

to a remedy at once. I heard of no action

Lieutenant Colonel replied, “I’ll tell you,

to pass) knew of its existence. Upon being

taken.

sir, that I will not again order my troops out

informed of this the officer in command at

(5) Officers and men were

unprotected against mechanized forces,

the dugout took no corrective action.

destroying their own effectiveness due

and you can tell that to anyone who

B. At dawn December 12th it was

to unnecessary loss of sleep. It is believed

wants to know!” The staff officer seemed

discovered that two artillery supply trucks

a directive was issued to correct this but

embarrassed, took no action as far as

were parked in a level space near a group

it was not widely disseminated.

I know. (Note: The only “mechanized

of CP’s. There was great excitement lest

forces” employed were the Bren machine

the trucks expose the position of the

gun carriers of the British.)

CP. I was assigned to guide the trucks

D. Lieutenant Colonel of the Winnipeg
Fusiliers. The colonel commanding this
battalion had broken under the strain of
battle and had been hospitalized, leaving
the lieutenant-colonel in command.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011

A. On December 11th great difficulty

to the artillery supply headquarters. On
9. Incidents

the way we passed twenty loose pack

In the belief that the detailed reporting

mules, partially packed; a short while later

of certain personally observed happenings

saw an Indian detachment of an artillery
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pack train proceeding in our direction.

driver stating that he had been unable to

As a name was thought of that officer

They had neither officers nor orders. I

find the place.

was summoned to headquarters by

sent men back for the loose animals,

F. On December 15th I relieved a

telephone, sometimes told to bring his

then took trucks and train to the supply

lieutenant at a concrete OP overlooking

men, sometimes not. It was agreed that

station. The British captain in command

Aberdeen. The OP was 8’ square,

eight platoons were available. The major,

of the station seemed at a loss as to what

so designed that one watcher had to

who was present when the orders were

to do with them.

alternate between the two ports in order

received, was to lead the attack. No

C. The afternoon of December 13th I saw

to observe the entire sector. There was no

supplementary orders were issued.

two 4.5” howitzer in position in the center

map. No provision was made for blackout,

At 3:30 p.m. only two provisional

of a large level lawn. Guns were spaced

other than laboriously closing the steel

platoons, with one Bren gun carrier, were

at twelve yards. Camouflage consisted

shutters. Furniture was one cot and one

assembled. Included in the troops were

only of nets improperly stretched. There

small table. Personnel (Indian) was one

about ten engineers and twenty Scots, a

was no digging. Ammunition was neatly

Battery Commander’s Assistant (non-

few dockyard workers. Each platoon had

stacked outside the nets. Gun crews

commissioned officer trained as observer)

one officer.

were resting on the porch of the house. In

and three signalmen. These men with

No arrangements were made for

response to questions, the Gun Position

their equipment literally filled the dugout,

communication, supply, artillery or mortar

Officer informed me that he could not

their loud talking never ceased. Since the

support. Each platoon carried one Bren

occupy any of the several natural howitzer

telephone wires were deeply buried there

gun in addition to the one in the single

positions in the immediate vicinity as this

was no possible use for the signalmen so

carrier. No medical personnel was

was the position surveyed. He stated that

at dusk I had them report to their adjutant,

present.

proper fortification would be accomplished

informing him by telephone. He was most

The path or secondary road to

that night. After the surrender I again saw

reluctant to take them. At dawn an Indian

Wongneicheong Gap was perhaps a mile

this position. Pits were geometric four

lieutenant came to relieve me. The orders

and a half long. After leaving the picket

yards square, one foot deep; removed

were that the two officers would stand

in the vicinity of Canadian headquarters

earth had been placed in a parapet two

alternate reliefs of 24 hours; the BCA

there was not a single defending soldier

feet high on three sides; there were no

presumably never being relieved (this was

between there and the Gap. At a gap

personnel trenches.

actually being carried out in other OP’s).

about half way we ran into interdiction

D. The night of December 13th I

The BCA had been on duty for four days.

mortar fire at the rate of shell every fifteen

spent at an OP overlooking Hongkong

I established reliefs to include the BCA of

seconds. By timing and dispatching his

harbor. The Lieutenant in charge and I

24 hours on, 12 hours off. During three

men in groups, the major traversed this

had difficulty in locating the concrete OP,

days only three meals were sent up, but

spot with only one man wounded. Shortly

then found the view of the shoreline was

the distinction between British and Indian

thereafter one platoon was detached

blocked by a house in our immediate

rations was not forgotten.

and sent over the crest of the mountain

front. We moved to the veranda of the

G. On December 19th at about 2:30

to attack the Gap. It was later disclosed

house. Wire was extended very slowly

p.m. the commander of the Winnipeg

that it had not yet reached the crest when

and routed badly. No map was available

Fusiliers received telephone orders for a

darkness fell, at which time it returned

(except the one I carried) although target

general counterattack at 3:30 p.m. First

to the CP.

designation was normally by coordinates.

objective was Wongneicheong Gap,

The Major, with the other platoon,

This Lieutenant was to have instructed

thence east about a mile, thence north

followed the path around the mountain.

me in British artillery methods, but it

about a mile to a certain hill. Scots would

With the Bren gun carrier in the lead, we

developed that he knew less about them

be on the left. That was all there was of

proceeded cautiously around each nose,

than I did.

the order.

reconnoitring the next stretch of road,

E. On December 15th I was instructed

The commander, his adjutant and a

through which we then ran. Around one

to be at 9:00 a.m. at a point near an OP

major then discussed who was available

such nose we could see a road beyond

where a car was to pick me up. The car

for the attack, units being referred to

Wongneicheong Gap, stretching uphill

arrived at 12:30 p.m., the British sergeant

by the names of their commanders.

directly away from us. The range was
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about 600 yards. For a space of some 200

that one group of brave men that had

one, posted by me in an antiaircraft

yards the road was black with Japanese

prevented the Japanese from advancing

machine gun pit, had disappeared. Their

infantry resting. The two Brens were put

all the way to Wanchai Gap in the West

machine gun was in the pit, as was also

in position off the road. My suggestion

and Repulse Bay in the south within a day

a Japanese rifle. The center picket I could

was not to open fire unless the target

after the landing

not locate. The personnel of the southern

moved, to send back the carrier to report

Dominating the opposite side of the

picket was found on the path well behind

the target, ask for artillery fire, and bring

Gap was a stone house, a police station,

their post. The sergeant left in charge

us more firepower, in the meantime to

held by the Japanese.

stated he thought there was no more

put our riflemen behind the crest so they

Darkness was coming on. The

use for the picket. I ordered him back

could quickly establish a firing line on

Major had not heard from his detached

immediately with the three Bren guns

signal. The decision was to open fire

platoon, his other six to follow, or the

then available, with orders to support the

immediately with the two machine guns.

Scots. His men were tired and hungry,

police station by fire when it was attacked.

One gunner could not identify the target

many had not eaten that day. After having

Before having an opportunity to post other

and did not fire. The other fired in bursts of

just seen enemy troops outnumbering

security detachments, I heard a great

five rounds, by the third or fourth of which

him three or four to one he decided

babble of voices from a road below us to

the target had dissolved. There was no

to wait for reinforcements. We could

the south. Going to investigate I met the

return fire.

hear the Japanese entrenching and

Lieutenant of the 1st Platoon and several

We advanced to the next nose which,

talking on the hillside facing us, but in

officers of the Scots. The noise was made

somewhat detached from the mountain,

the gathering dusk could see nothing

by the Scots who had gone to the HQ

formed a ridge about 300 yards long. It

of them. A CP was designated on the

dugouts, rested, then marched up the

ran north and south with its crest only 100

path. While the Lieutenant posted local

concrete road between us and the police

yards west of Wongneicheong Gap. The

security detachments the Major went on

station and were in a compact mass in

path by which we had arrived ran thirty

reconnaissance from which he failed to

a hollow below. They claimed they had

feet below the crest. Both north and south

return.

been fired upon from the police station.

the ground fell away steeply from the

About 9:00 p.m. some 150 Scots

Shouting brought out that it was indeed

divide. Looking down from the north end

arrived. They were obsessed with the

again in Japanese hands. As no one had

we could see considerably below us at a

idea of going to the headquarters dugouts

heard the sound of fighting they must

distance of 200 yards the headquarters

to the north. I guided them part way and

have been careless and been completely

dugouts of in one of which the Canadian

returned to the CP. Another platoon of

surprised.

Brigadier had been killed the night before.

Canadians had arrived, with four officers,

The Scots wanted to attack at

At the point where the path rounded the

including a major. They decided to storm

once, before daylight. They could not

southern end of the crest there was a

the police station at once. If there were

be persuaded to send a message back

shallow artificial cave which contained a

any orders given, I didn’t hear them. The

and let the artillery blow up the house for

quantity of abandoned material, including

officers simply walked off, followed by as

them. They requested that I give them

machine guns with ammunition, mortars

many men as felt the urge, and took the

one minute of fire from the Brens to cover

without ammunition. There was no

station with grenades and rifle fire. The

their advance. The Lieutenant of the 1st

telephone instrument to connect to the

Major and two other officers were killed in

Platoon was sent to collect his men and

line there. A few dead and two wounded

this attack. A strong detachment, with the

post them to protect our left flank. I went to

British soldiers were found.

surviving officer, was left at the building,

the one picket, found them so lax that two

the remainder withdrawn to the shelter of

Japanese with grenades were discovered

the ridge.

less than twenty yards from the three

Three hundred yards to the south, but
out of our reach, was a private house in
which a British post was still holding out

I slept at the CP for several hours.

machine guns. The guns were grouped

with one or more Vickers machine guns.

When I awakened the Lieutenant of the

closely together in a position with no field

Whenever the Japanese tried to cross the

1st platoon was not in evidence, nor had

of fire. When moving them I found that in

concrete road through the Gap they got a

he left word of his whereabouts. I went

the group of fourteen men only one was a

burst of fire in the flank. It was probably

out to inspect the pickets. The northern

machine gunner, only two others had ever
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fired a machine gun. Our preparation was

after having left it, the cave was empty

Arriving at the position we found it

duly fired but was not very effective, one

except for a badly wounded sailor. No one

deserted. Some abandoned equipment,

gunner sending every shot over the roof

was in sight at the CP or the ridge. I went

including several rifles, was lying about.

of the building.

up the ridge, found a number of Scots

Prompt visual reconnaissance disclosed

The Scots made little use of

lying down, well scattered. They directed

no Japanese troops in sight. The location

grenades, though they came within

me to their lieutenant, also lying down and

was excellent for an artillery OP as all

grenade distance of the police station.

too tired to rise. He could tell me nothing

roads and trails to the west and south

The attack was repulsed with, I believe,

of the Canadians. He didn’t want any

of Wongneicheong Gap were covered in

two officers killed, two wounded. Losses

rations or tea; the men had rations and

part. The only pair of field glasses was a

in men (as in the case of the Canadian

were too tired to walk to the tea. He did

poor one carried by me. We could plainly

attack) were comparatively light.

not want any ammunition. He ignored my

see the house in which was located

As dawn broke the Scots decided to

suggestion that at least a guide be posted

our headquarters, but a suggestion to

take over the ridge. I sent all my remaining

on the road. In the hearing of a number of

establish a visual signalling station was

men, 26, into the cave previously

his men he told me things were terrible,

vetoed.

mentioned. The senior sergeant was

himself and the men exhausted.

It was decided to divide the command

carefully instructed to hold all the men

The wounded sailor had died. The

to cover the two routes of possible attack.

there until my return, to find the Lieutenant

road back was deserted, the engineer

Men were held on the reverse slope with

and instruct him to assemble his men

detachment having disappeared, as had

a minimum of observers forward.

at the same place. I got the Bren gun

the walking wounded, some of whom we

carrier and returned to the Canadian CP.

saw dead by the roadside.

During the day my men were required
to be separated and to be quiet, with the

The carrier was sent to the cookhouse

At the Canadian CP I could not

result that they were asleep when not on

for rations and tea while I made my

convince the commanding officer of the

duty and were quite rested at night. The

report. The CO had not previously had a

desirability of immediately reinforcing and

Lieutenant did not follow that policy. During

single report of this action. He instructed

holding the ridge and clearing out snipers

the morning the peak of the mountain was

me to bring all Canadians back for a

in its rear. The ridge was a strong natural

shelled from Kowloon, the overs falling

rest, did not agree that they could rest

position, blocking advance to the west

close to the Lieutenant’s group. The bulk

where they were while remaining in a

while dominating the roads from north

of this was withdrawn to dead space

position to support the Scots if needed.

and south, and seemed to me especially

near my position, without casualty. The

My request for medical assistance could

advantageous as an artillery forward OP.

Lieutenant was quite worried over making

apparently not be complied with, nor could

H. Before dawn December 21st I

contact with Canadians supposed to be

I be provided with morphine. Laying a

was sent to report to the engineers at

on our left and took almost his entire unit

telephone wire was for some reason not

their headquarters in their private house

on an expedition to make it. He returned,

considered feasible.

in the vicinity of Wanchai Gap. When

successful, after three hours of difficult

At the cookhouse the NCO in charge

I reported to the Colonel commanding

crawling and climbing to his original

refused to issue rations or make tea until

he was supervising the issue of rum, a

position. The net result was merely to tire

I threatened him.

half tumbler per man. He said a platoon

further his men since the half mile gap

On the return to Wongneicheong Gap

was being sent out under a lieutenant

remained open.

we passed several wounded men making

to relieve a detachment on the southern

Many of the men had brought beer, a

their way to the rear. At one point we were

crest of Mt. Cameron, and he requested

few water. It was all consumed by noon.

hailed from the woods by a lieutenant of

me to join them. As again no map but mine

No rations were carried. By nightfall the

engineers who had a detachment with

was available I acted as guide.

Lieutenant expressed, in the hearing of

him. He wanted to know if he was needed

The ascent of the steep mountain

some men, his dissatisfaction with the

at Wongneicheong Gap, said he had no

was exceedingly laborious; the men could

situation. He sent a runner with a verbal

orders. I told him he was badly needed.

not keep up with even the slow strength-

message to request (a) that the platoon

We were sniped at from the mountainside

saving pace set by me. It was necessary

be relieved as it was exhausted, (b) that

above us. When we arrived, one hour

to halt for a rest every fifty yards.

rations, water and rum be sent up. No
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This photograph was taken during an American B-24 raid on Hong Kong in late 1944. The image is taken looking northward and shows
the southern part of the Hong Kong mainland and the northern part of the island. A great cloud of smoke can be seen rising from
the Kowloon docks. Across from Kowloon is the city of Victoria. In the bottom right corner is the Lye Mun Passage. The mountainous
nature of the colony is clearly shown here.
reply was received; the runner did not

During the day and night there was

were returned heavily laden. I brought up

return. In the hearing of the men he said

no enemy activity in our vicinity. What little

the question of an OP, suitable observing

we were all too tired to put up much of

activity we had observed in the distance

instruments, a visual station, telephone

a fight.

during the daytime was not reported, even

wire, and entrenching. He said he would

After dark we moved to the forward

though the runner had been sent at dusk.

think about it, asked me if I would conduct

slopes where we could well cover the

At dawn my relief was up. I returned

three important draws. We had no

to the engineer CP with two runners. The

The relieving platoon was

entrenching tools so did not improve the

Colonel was astonished that rations had

commanded by a captain. Again we took

natural position.

not been sent up but did not seem to

no entrenching tools, signal flags or lights.

know whom to blame. The two runners

Few grenades were carried; we would
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take over the grenades there (the fifty

route over five miles, and were well tired

minor casualties, perhaps three or four

were considered to be quite a number)

out. I showed the Lieutenant his position.

men killed or seriously wounded. Men

as well as the two submachine guns. A

K. On the morning of December 25th

commenced to leave singly, in pairs and

large jug of rum was carried. We arrived

the Japanese made the most intensive

threes, over an exposed path to the west;

at the position just before dark, again

bombardment of the battle, using planes,

the adjutant made no effort to stop them.

found it deserted, with more abandoned

guns and mortars against the British

No attempt was made to fight back.

equipment and rifles in evidence. Rum

positions. Casualties were not heavy

was issued, the posts then manned as

but the moral effect was considerable.

before. At dawn the Captain asserted he

From about 8:00 the Lieutenant-Colonel

had no orders to man the position after

commanding the Canadians started

daylight and withdrew the platoon. The

receiving telephone calls from the Major

While comments have been freely

Colonel displayed no perturbation at thus

with whom he had had the alcoholic

indulged in throughout this report it is

giving up a position which had not even

argument the night before. The Major

believed the following two points may

been attacked.

was in a key pillbox near Aberdeen and

have been insufficiently stressed:

At 3:00 p.m. the Colonel returned,
ordered the white flag raised.
10. Comments on the British

I. About December 23rd the Governor

was being heavily attacked. He was very

1. The individual courage shown by

visited the Canadian CP at Wanchai

concerned about his badly wounded

officers and men was amazing in view of

Gap. He made quite a speech, telling the

and insisted that an ambulance be sent

their low morale. The officers especially

officers of the importance of Hongkong

(obviously impossible) to take them

went forward to their deaths without

and why it must be held to the last ounce

out. Some time during the morning he

hesitancy although they had in their

of fighting power. They were entirely

capitulated.

hearts no hope of success.

unimpressed and upon his departure

L. About noon December 25th the

2. Destruction of valuable property

CO of the Scots said he had just received

was poorly carried out. The enemy

J. About 2:00 a.m., December 25th, a

orders to go out with all personnel and

captured large quantities of oil, arms, and

British Lieutenant of engineers reported to

defend the headquarters position to the

munitions. It is probable that even some

the Colonel of the Scots. He was directed

last man. With security detachments on

of the 9.2” seacoast guns were taken

to put his detachment in position about

the hills above, the ravine could have

undamaged and still with a considerable

300 yards from the CP, defending a trail

been made hard to take. We abandoned

supply of ammunition.

from the south. When he expressed

it, climbed the steep ravine and took

ignorance of the trail (although shown

refuge in a private house and its yard

him on the map) a sergeant major was

near the crest of a hill. The Canadians

1. Tactics of the Japanese seemed

designated as his guide.

occupied one slightly below us. The

suited to the situation. On the occasion

made disparaging remarks.

11. Comments on the Japanese

About 4:00 a.m. I took a patrol of Scots

Colonel was at this time was called to a

of landing at North Point, they advanced

down this trail with instructions to proceed

conference, to which he departed alone.

through difficult terrain with startling

some two miles and return, driving back

Left in the house were his adjutant

speed. Their quick exploitation of this

and a young Canadian officer so drunk

landing was probably the outstanding

any enemy patrols encountered.
Arriving at the position presumably

he could scarcely stand up, and perhaps

feat of the battle. For the remainder

occupied by the engineers I found it

eighty men with Scots predominating. The

of the time their advance was made

vacant and sent back a runner to find

men drank freely until the liquor ran out.

cautiously, consolidating the ground as

out if the detachment had been ordered

Dive bombers were dropping large

they went. They maintained light pressure

withdrawn. We proceeded down the path

phosphorous bombs in the general area,

on the British by means of small patrols,

a half mile when we heard a body of men

setting fire to a few houses and starting

infiltrating through the British lines for

making their way up a dry watercourse

brush fires. Artillery from Kowloon was

short distances. British positions were

below us. The patrol was in a beautiful

bombarding house after house near

located, probably by a combination of

position to drop grenades on them. Just

us but fortunately did not register on

patrols, aerial and terrestrial observation,

in time, we found it was the engineer

the one we were in nor that of the

and were then mortared. The prompt

detachment, still with its guide. They had

Canadians. Many mortar shells fell in

withdrawal of the British was followed by

been lost, had covered in a roundabout

and around us without causing more than

methodical occupation by the Japanese.
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2. The moral effect of the Air Corps in

committed (I saw one Chinese being

population as the Colony produces almost

forcing the decision was great. The actual

beaten to death) but there was no general

nothing.

contribution was minor by comparison.

rape of the city.

Chief bombing targets were antiaircraft
guns and emplaced artillery. I saw

Urged by the Japanese, perhaps
half of the Chinese population returned to

12. Lessons

their villages in the provinces. Portuguese

no bombing or machine gunning of

The battle was a demonstration in

likewise returned to Macao. Citizens of

troops in the open. The value of their

blood of the correctness of military thought

belligerent or unfriendly countries were

aerial reconnaissance is unknown;

in the United States. Lessons to be drawn

interned. Citizens of truly neutral countries

they apparently employed no special

are believed obvious. Two points had

received very summary treatment; some

planes for the purpose but relied on their

such an influence on the outcome of the

were imprisoned, their businesses all but

pursuits and dive bombers for reports.

fighting that they are deemed of sufficient

confiscated outright.

In conjunction with artillery fire, great

importance to mention again:

No reports were received of any

damage was done gun positions, but

1. During maneuvers all ranks should

extensive fortifications, although there

which factor was the more important is

be trained to take as much sleep as

were rumors that the airport was being

problematical.

the situation allows. There is a natural

enlarged.

3. Artillery fire was very light

tendency to remain unnecessarily “on the

As of June 30th, the Colony was a

considering the number of guns available.

job” without rest, leading promptly to great

picture of desolation and despair, with

This could no doubt be attributed to the

reduction of the mental powers and later

food the primary thought of all strata of the

difficulty of ammunition supply. There

to physical collapse.

population. Many deaths have occurred

were stories of very accurate shooting

2. Men must be taught to overcome

from starvation, with many more to come.

but the firing which I personally observed

their natural fear of airplanes so that they

Medicine stocks are very low, with no

was inaccurate, dispersion was great both

may not be overly frightened by the roar

prospects of alleviation.

in range and deflection. Interdiction firing

of a few dive bombers.

their English masters, but it is a certainty

was usually one round a minute, evenly
spaced; on at least one occasion the

13. Hongkong Under the Japanese

rounds were erratically spaced. Key roads

The first thing immediately apparent

were not interdicted constantly but were

after the fall of the Colony was the

rather harassed for perhaps one hour,

unreadiness of the Japanese to govern

then let alone for several hours. During

it. There was great confusion caused

the off periods vehicles could proceed in

by a reported fight for power between

full view of the enemy without drawing fire.

the civil, military, and gendarmerie

4. As indicated above, the infantry

authorities. Orders were issued and

placed chief reliance on their light mortars.

countermanded, regulations made and

Machine guns were little used, rifles were

changed or not enforced. Currency

used only at point blank range, a condition

values, water, electricity, rental rates,

seldom met with. Patrolling was effective,

business permits, and transportation were

especially at night, showing the result of

a few of the questions remaining unsolved

long training. Their skill in camouflage

on June 30th.

was remarkable; this was undoubtedly a
considerable factor in their success.

Immediately after the surrender
shipping filled the harbor, engaged in the

5. Discipline of the troops as observed

wholesale looting of the city. Estimates of

after the capture was good. Their was

up to one hundred shiploads, largely of

little drunkenness. The usual tendency

foodstuffs and metals, were taken out the

to arrogance towards the conquered

first month. Thereafter looting proceeded

was observed. Looting by individuals

on a gradually diminishing scale. It was

is believed to have been on a minor

still in progress on June 30th. Looting of

scale. Many atrocities were undoubtedly

foodstuffs was exceedingly serious to the
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The Chinese may not have loved
that having seen the “New Order” at work
they would welcome back the old with
open arms.2

Editor’s postscript

C

ondon’s report says a great deal
but one of its most important
aspects is how it expresses the
prejudices held by some American
officers against their new allies.
Condon had direct personal
involvement in the course of the
Battle of Hong Kong and that makes
his report useful, especially in his
description of events at the Wong Nei
Chong Gap and his interaction with
some of the garrison’s officers, but
partly because of his own restricted
field of view as a combatant on
the ground as well as the colony’s
relative isolation from outside events,
comments on matters outside of
his own personal experience tend
79
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to skew the report. His assertion,
for example, that the Japanese did
not commit armour to the battle is
contradicted by Company SergeantMajor George MacDonell. While the
fight for Wong Nei Chong Gap was
winding down the sergeant-major
and a platoon of the Royal Rifles
of Canada destroyed a light AFV
with Molotov cocktails along the
eastern side of the island near Red
Hill. Major-General P. Montague, in
command of the Canadian Military
Headquarters in London, also
reported the presence of Japanese
light AFVs during the battle.3 More
significantly, comments about
the absence of coordinated Allied
strategic planning for south China
are similarly contradicted by officers
who served with Detachment 204.4
Coordinated plans were discussed in
Chungking on 9 December 1941 for
example, by Generalissimo Chiang
Kai Shek, British Military Mission

Dear Sir,
y article on “CH-147D Chinook
Nose Art in Afghanistan” was
published in Canadian Military History
20, no.1 (Winter 2011) while I was on
another deployment into Kandahar
and the Forward Operating Bases to
collect Op KEEPSAKE material prior
to the change in the mission from
that of combat to training the Afghan
military. This trip allowed me to
gather additional information on the
Chinook nose art. In his introductory
notes the editor-in-chief, Roger Sarty
lamented that the Vargas-style nose
art has fallen out of vogue. Roger
will be pleased to see that “Miss
Behavin’,” an image in the Vargas
style, has recently been added to
the stable of Chinook nose art. (See
back cover) Although not nearly
as revealing as the artwork which
adorned No.6 Group RCAF bombers
during the war, this newest example
of Chinook nose art does exemplify

M

80
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/8

commander Major-General Lance
Dennys, and the head of the US
Military Mission, Brigadier-General
John Magruder, in Chungking.5 Plans
were also discussed in Washington
prior to the outbreak of the Pacific
War.6
Following his release from
captivity, Major Condon was
eventually promoted to colonel and
he went on to serve in Y Force under
the command of Brigadier-General
Frank Dorn at Kunming.7
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12299, reel T-17901, file 3/Cdn Ops OS/1,
memorandum, 3 February 1942.
Hong Kong University (HKU) B.A.A.G.
Series, volume II, “Capture, Escape and
the Early B.A.A.G.,” Mission 204 War
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NARA, RG 407, entry 360, box 736, file
400.3295 4-14-41 sec. 2, telegram no.90 by
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LAC RG 25, vol.2920, file 2670-A-40C-1;
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the pleasant curves of the female form
which in this case is accented with
red hair and a low-cut form fitting
red dress.
During my recent trip into
theatre, I not only had a ride on
“2 for Hooking” but I discovered
that the Canadian artwork was a
modification of the artwork which
was originally on the helicopter
when it was received from the U.S.
Army. Unfortunately in May 2011
“2 For Hooking” was lost in a crash
in which four persons were injured.
The nose art from this helicopter may
eventually be recovered and returned
to a museum in Canada.
WO Ed Storey
CEFCOM HQ – War Diarist
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